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ALAN MILNER *

The Development of African Law
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank you
for the privilege you have extended to me in inviting me to address
you today. It is a truly international gesture for an American society
to invite an Englishman to address it on the subject of African law.
I would like to transport you from this rather chilly and blustery
Washington day to the warmer climes of Africa. Africa, if I may
place it for you geographically, is a fairly large island somewhere to
the east of the United States. It is large enough to be more than three
times the size of the United States and to have a population about
one and a half times that of the United States. But in a vast physical
range of conditions from massive deserts to steaming jungles and of
economic conditions from untold luxury to abysmal poverty, it boasts
only seven cities with populations of over half a million (whereas the
United States has twenty) and 80 out of every 100 Africans live at
subsistence level outside the urban areas. What were once English,
French, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and German Colonies have now
developed into over thirty independent states and only a handful of
dependent territories remain. More important for our present purpose
of charting the development of African law, the 3,500 tribes of Africa,
speaking between them some 1,000 different languages, have now
been enclosed within the modern political boundaries of these states.
That linguistic problems may assume major importance in the
development of African law is a proposition that I would like to state
at the very beginning. The whole range of cultural factors-social
problems, historical development, political structure, economic caste
-that goes into the making of a political and legal system is to be
found as a range of factors affecting the development of a language.
Let me tell you a true legal-linguistic story about Africa. Before my
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departure from Northern Nigeria last summer, I was invited to have
my photograph taken with a group of sixty customary court judges,
not one of whom spoke English. They greeted the photographer's
instruction to "Say, cheese" with looks of frank bewilderment and
asked me to translate for them. I told them that "cheese" was the
English word for their own "chuku"-whereupon they all said
"chuku" to the camera and produced a photograph which somehow
fell short of the desired effect.
I would like to identify for you two stages in the development
of African law. They are stages which follow the simple historical and
political criteria of the period of colonial rule and the more recent
and shorter period of independence. I shall be confining myself
unless otherwise stated to those countries which were formerly British
colonies.
When colonial rule was first set up, the British administration
found traditional laws in full operation and, depending upon the
political development of the community, a more or less sophisticated
system of legal adjudication. Laws of some sort exist in every community, no matter how simple; courts do not necessarily exist in the
form in which we understand them today but means exist for settling
disputes, be they feuding, compromising, or other means. It was the
British policy to retain the traditional forms of political organization
as far as possible in their naturally-evolved state and to rule through
them. Consequently, although the common practice was to introduce
the common law and the doctrines of equity into these newly dependent territories and to apply them through the means of colonial judges
and magistrates, the traditional laws and the traditional courts-where
they existed-were recognized and allowed to stay functioning under
British supervision, with their jurisdiction limited to Africans only.
Having done this, though, the policy of the era was then a confining one. The traditional law applied and the traditional courts
operated entirely in the traditional area-the area of family disputes,
of land quarrels, of chieftaincy succession, and customary wrongs.
It was an era of leaving the customary institutions alone; of allowing
them to apply laws which were never reduced to writing and handed
down by an exclusively oral tradition; and of leaving the customary
courts in the hands of largely untrained judges.
The major developments that did take place were mainly in the
area of the introduced law and judicial system. This was the area of
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the criminal law, of the commercial law, of European-type marriage
and divorce systems to back up the introduction of Christianity, and
of English real property law to provide the basic ground rules for the
development of the new urban communities, be they settler communities or traditional African urban areas developing into modern towns
on European lines.
Although the major policy was one of letting the traditional law
develop, insofar as it developed at all, in the natural way of responding
to changed social conditions, there were important ways in which
traditional life and law were related to the introduced law. The first
was, admittedly, a policy of limitation; the second a policy of providing a legal bridge between the two systems of law.
The limitation policy which threatened to strike deep into customary law was that which decreed that customary laws could only
be recognized and enforced if they were not repugnant to ideas of
"natural justice, equity and good conscience." I would not like you
to think that this meant that the colonial administrations embarked
upon any deep philosophical inquiry to implement this standard.
"Natural justice" means no more than the American "due process of
law"; it is a shorthand formula for a standard of fairness and, like its
United States counterpart, was applied in Africa in both substantive
and procedural contexts. The basic policy given life under this formula was not that customary laws should be struck down if contrary
to English law: this was often explicitly denied in theory and implemented in practice. The policy appears to have been to take the
English procedural standards as guidelines but to adopt an open mind
on substantive law's issues-as open a mind, that is, as an English,
or English-trained, common-law and Christianity-oriented mind could
ever be in the African context.
Under the banner of natural justice, the remnants of the slave
trade were made unenforceable, the amputation of the hands of
thieves and the stoning to death of adulterous women were discontinued, the exclusion of non-Moslem and female witnesses from Moslem proceedings was declared unlawful, and Islamic law procedures
which denied the right of defense to men accused of certain types of
murder were struck down.
The provisions which laid bridges between the traditional and
the introduced law systems were important for the development of a
unified corpus of law in each African jurisdiction and remain of
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crucial importance today. They are bridges which recognize that
the two systems of law co-existing in the same jurisdiction are not
mutually exclusive and that there may be movement between them in
many ways. The traditional courts, for example, were commonly
allowed jurisdiction over Africans if their mode of life was that of
the general native community-thereby envisaging the impact that
European contact would and did have upon the way of life of many
Africans. Once they left the hold of customary law by becoming
"detribalized" or "westernized," they crossed the bridge to the common law system.
The African convert to Christianity found that he had to abandon
polygamy and give up all his wives but one. If he married after
conversion it would be in the Christian form under the introduced
law and thereafter he would be liable to penalty if he attempted to
sneak back into his customary marriage system by marrying again.
The African who wanted to buy a bicycle on hire-purchase terms
would find himself removed from the customary arena, not only
because bicycles were a commodity unknown to customary law but
because the form of the transaction was one patently European and
so governed by the common law. Or a family, offered a good price
for its land by a European commercial concern, soon saw the attractions of the English land-holding system, under which land was alienable, in contrast to the customary system in which it was usually not.
Conversions of customary tenures into fee simples became a feature
of urban land-holding in Africa.
The questions that remained unanswered at this stage were to
remain troublesome until the present day. They were basically problems concerning the sensitivity of the introduced laws to the local
ethos. The English common law and legislation, the courts, prisons,
and other legal processes, were appropriate to England. They were,
too, no doubt to all those colonies to which Englishmen had migrated
and settled, with more or less disregard of the indigenous inhabitants.
But how far were they suited to application to other peoples-peoples
for whom they did not represent the "common custom of the realm,"
who regarded them not with enthusiastic support but with hostility or
suspicion, and whose social, economic, and philosophical attitudes
they did not represent? The traditional laws, developed by the people
to meet the contingencies arising in their lives, were sensitive to their
needs; the introduced laws, though they did not apply to the totality
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of Africans' lives and often provided answers to new problems in the
culture-conflicting colonial world, were often patently insensitive.
Sometimes the insensitivity was ludicrous-as in the case, for
example, of the Tanganyikaii legislation penalizing the African who
was found outside at night in suspicious circumstances "with his face
blackened"-a case of the inadvisability of copying English legislation
verbatim without any cross-cultural modification. Slightly less ludicrous but no less insensitive was the British attitude towards witchcraft and the supernatural-belief in which could drive an African
to kill in self-defense and disbelief in which led the British courts to
convict of murder. Even the trappings of British forensic processes,
the wigs, gowns, and high collars, admirable for wear in the draughty
corridors of Westminster, were transported to the rather less suitable
and infinitely more steamy courtrooms of Lagos and Lusaka.
Independence in the last decade for almost all the British territories in Africa has- lead to a heightening, not a diminution of the
problems. Each country has inherited the dualistic legal system, the
bifurcated court structure, the unwritten laws and the inappropriate
laws. And each, though assuming the title of nation in the international political arena, has been unable to conceal the fact that its
nationhood is only nominal. The tribal and linguistic differences are
still there, aggravated not merely by their own diversity but by the
differential social, educational, and economic development within
each country-forces which, far from fostering national unity, promote divisiveness.
The three dilemmas that have therefore faced the new nations
have been these:
First, their concern to try to develop, in the fact of the divisive
forces within them, laws which represent their national character.
Second, the major problem of trying to work towards the unification of the disparate law systems, it being recognized as wholly
inappropriate for an independent country to have one law and one
court for "natives" and one for others.
Third, a concern with international respectability-a desire not
to appear barbaric, backward, and internally disordered when entering the international arena-a desire prompted not only by a sense
of propriety but also by the more tangible economic motives of countries anxious to attract foreign aid and investment. How then, have
these dilemmas been solved? Or rather, how are the African nations
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trying to solve them because I do not think that final answers have
yet been given and certainly there are not a large number of laws
already on the books which represent the solutions to these problems.
Firstly, let me deal with the question of the African nation's
concern with international respectability. As the nations enter the
international arena they become aware that there are international
standards of personal liberty, of the treatment of citizens, and of
methods of ajudication which they should observe. One of the interesting developments in Africa is the fact that there is a growing awareness that individual liberty should be protected against state action in
a formal way and a number of newly independent countries have
therefore enacted constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights
based on the European Convention on Human Rights. They have,
perhaps unfortunately, retained the drastically qualified form of the
original, so that the rights are only recognized insofar as they are
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society," whatever that may
mean. But the effort has been made and a tradition has been established of setting down on paper the fact that a belief in fundamental
rights is held in Africa.
Secondly, let me say something of the ways in which the African
countries are approaching the problems of the unification of their
laws and law-applying machinery. The one significant development
that is taking place in many countries, consistent with the international
respectability which I have already mentioned, is that written codes of
criminal law and criminal procedure are beginning to supersede the
customary criminal laws. They are codes which apply the international
standards of the ascertainability of norms (in contrast to the largely
unwritten customary laws) of fair trial procedures (I have already
spoken about some of the more blatant unfairnesses which were struck
down under colonial administration) and of non-discrimination between citizens.
I would like to elaborate upon this last point briefly. One of the
consequences of a multiplicity of tribes and tribal law systems has
been the independent development of each law system. A person
whose personal law was that of one tribal group would not be governed by the law of another tribal group and, indeed, might even be
legally discriminated against by members of that other group. It is a
familiar social characteristic that the outsider is often treated differently from the insider. Sometimes, for example, an offense committed
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by a member of the group would call for compensation or some other
form of peaceful settlement. If the same offense were committed by
a person outside the group the sanctions might be retaliatory and
possibly even fatal. One of my favorite illustrations of this discriminatory process comes from Islamic law. It was laid down there that if
a person were murdered the remedy lay entirely in the discretion of
his blood relatives. They could have the offender put to death if they
wished or instead could accept financial compensation for the death
of their kinsman. The scales of compensation were strictly laid down.
A male Muslim had a certain assigned value, let us say about $200.
The rate to be paid on the death of a female Muslim woman being
something of a debased currency, was half that of the male. If the
person killed, on the other hand, were Christian his relatives could
only be compensated at the same rate as a Muslim woman. And if
the deceased were a Christian woman, the compensation would be
reduced by half again. This was bad enough, but when the person
killed was a pagan the compensation became payable at the rate of
1/15th of the original male Muslim rate and the pagan woman 1/30th
of that rate. To me, this seems a classic example of the discriminatory values which members of the in-group placed on the heads of
those who were not members of their group. It is a system which has
fortunately now been committed to history.
Reverting for a moment to the question of how far the laws can
be made sensitive to the African cultures, there are one or two interesting examples of the incorporation of customary laws and penalties
into the criminal codes of Africa. Kenya, for instance, abolished its
customary criminal laws but preserved as part of its penal code a
small group of customary offenses relating to marriage which were
apparently considered essential to the proper organization of a culturally sensitive code. Similarly, in Northern Nigeria, a Muslim
country, Muslim criminal laws and procedures were abolished in 1960
in favor of a common law code but some Muslim law offenses such
as drinking alcohol, unlawful sexual intercourse, and slandering the
chastity of a woman were incorporated into the new code. And procedures peculiar to some of the local customary laws, such as a ceremonial public beating for persons found guilty of certain kinds of
offences, and compromise procedures which allowed the private settlement of criminal charges were also for the first time given statutory
form.
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But not all of the new criminal laws are culturally sensitive.
Bechuanaland adopted a new code for 1964 by simply copying that
of Zambia which, in turn, had been based on a common law model.
Ethiopia has adopted a whole complex of new criminal, civil, commercial, and procedural codes in the last ten years. Yet they were
drafted by distinguished French and Swiss professors, based upon the
French and Swiss codes, written in French and only later translated
into Amharic, the official language of the country. With a court system only now for the first time being trained, one wonders how fair
it is appropriate to apply the sophisticated civilian concepts of Western
Europe to the wholly different context of Ethiopia. One cannot escape
the feeling that perhaps something has been lost in translation.
Apart from the area of criminal law what is being done about
the remaining laws? In some ways, particularly in the fields of family
law and property law, the customary laws are the classic examples
of laws which are culturally sensitive. It is difficult to change them
rapidly without impairing the fabric of the societies which have given
birth to them. Nonetheless, if national unity is a dominant value, the
multiplicity of personal laws cannot continue without modification.
The most notable example of the struggle towards a homogeneous
system of civil law is to be seen in East Africa at the present time.
Kenya is attempting to write down for the first time the customary
laws of all its different tribal and local residential units with a view,
however, not to amalgamating them straight away but to preserving
them until such time as changing social circumstances bring them
closer together. Tanganyika proposes to take the next step. It is not
only writing down its customary personal laws (under the auspices of
a Restatement project which is, of course, wrongly named since there
has never been any original statement) but then proposes to try to
bring about a unification of all these laws so that a single code of
customary personal law will be applied within the country. In effect,
it is proposing to enact a new personal law which is at the present time
the personal law of no tribe but which is sufficiently similar to many
of them to obtain wide and uniform recognition as the law. How far
the individual units within the scheme will be prepared to relinquish
their own domestically-evolved customary laws in favor of this hybrid
remains to be seen.
Fourthly, unification of law systems is not enough. There must
also be unification of the court systems so that the stigma of separateInternational Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 2
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ness does not carry through much longer in the new African nations.
Here there are policy problems and manpower problems. No country
can afford to abolish its customary courts because they are the only
courts which are properly sensitive to the cultural problems and also
because no nation is, as yet, so well supplied with qualified lawyers
that it can replace all its customary judges. In Northern Nigeria, for
example, we had over 750 customary courts with an average of 10
personnel-judges, registrars, clerks, court members, and so on-in
each court. What we tried to do with these men represents one aspect
of the development problem. It was our objective to impart to them
as much knowledge of the new codes, which they were administering
for the first time, as would make them efficient representatives of the
state. You cannot teach much criminal law and procedure to a group
of men who have never had any formal legal education, who are not
accustomed to applying written laws strictly, and who probably have
major language problems. But at least a beginning has been made in
upgrading the basic qualifications of those working within the customary court system of that country. Indeed, this pattern has proved
so attractive that several other countries of English-speaking Africa
have followed it.
The other aspect of unification development has taken the form
of appointing qualified lawyers as presidents of customary courts.
Obviously, this needs an ample supply of trained lawyers and, as yet,
probably only Ghana and the southern areas of Nigeria have the
trained lawyers in sufficient numbers. It is worth note, however, that
there are probably just as many difficulties associated with this way of
attacking the problem as there are with the method I have just described. The legally qualified president of customary court is not a
"customary" judge. He does not know the customary law, because
he has not been trained in it but rather has received his legal education
either abroad or in one of his country's new universities. If, therefore,
he is called upon to decide a dispute at the local level where customary
law is to be the determining norm he will probably find that, far from
it being an easy problem to solve, he will have to go to those local
people who are learned in the customary law and take their opinion
as to the state of the law before he can even start applying it. No
doubt, problems such as this and problems of familiarity with the
local languages will die out in due course as the customary laws are
unified and expressed in a common language. But at the present time
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with multiplicity of laws and multiplicity of languages, it is extremely
difficult for an outsider (and by that I mean not merely a non-African
but also an African from another local area) to operate effectively.
The development of facilities for legal education and the bringing
of new skills to the developing African legal professions are essential
ideas for future development. At last the bonds tying Africa to an
exclusively English legal education have been broken. The new African lawyer no longer has to wait until he is admitted to the bar before
he discovers anything of Africa's legal problems, for he now discovers
them as soon as he enters law school. The member of the African bar
no longer has to depend entirely upon his education as an English
barrister when, in fact, he is going to be practicing in a fused profession in his own country. Now he is able to obtain some of the skills
and all of the sense of professional responsibility from a purely African
education. But this does not mean that he is casting aside international
standards, for those who have been entrusted with the development
of African legal education and of the legal professions of Africa have
been internationally selected and owe their allegiances to the international world of scholarship and professional responsibility.
Scholarship and professional responsibility are reaching towards
Africa and Africa is eagerly reaching out towards them. A story was
once told of a young African returning to his native country after
qualifying as a member of the English bar. As he walked down the
gangplank of the ship on arrival at his home port, his assembled
relatives and friends saw that he was immaculately dressed in the
uniform of the English city gentleman-a black jacket, striped trousers, carrying an umbrella and brief case, but having his bowler hat
turned upside down on his head. "Surely, Joshua," they asked,
"Englishmen wear their bowler hats the other way up." "Ah, yes,"
replied Joshua, "they do, but I am not an Englishman, I am an African
and I am not wearing my bowler hat, I am carrying it." This is the
spirit of innovation and adaptation that is strong in Africa. The development of its law is a challenge that is readily being met and though
the work will not be completed for many generations, it is being
approached in the true spirit of concern for international responsibility and the goal of human dignity under the law.

International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2

